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DOMESTIC LAW
I. WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS
CONSTITUTE MARITAL PROPERTY
The domestic law case of Orszula v. Orszula1 presented the
South Carolina Supreme Court with an issue of first impression:
are workers' compensation awards marital property and, there-
fore, subject to equitable distribution upon divorce? The court
held that such awards were marital property.2 Orszula repre-
sents a general expansion of the concept of marital property in
this state. The practicing attorney, however, is admonished to
view this holding cautiously, for the court's cursory analysis is
potentially misleading. A slight change in the facts likely would
change the court's analysis.
Soon after Deborah and Bozydar Orszula's marriage in 1981,
Ms. Orszula quit school and went to work, thus enabling her
husband to complete his education. In 1982 Mr. Orszula, while
employed as a technician in a community theatre, was seriously
injured. Ms. Orszula nursed her husband back to health from
temporary total disability. Soon thereafter the couple separated,
and, subsequently, Mr. Orszula received a $16,000 lump-sum
settlement of his workers' compensation claim.
In the divorce action, the family court found the workers'
compensation award to constitute marital property subject to
equitable distribution. The court ordered the award to be di-
vided evenly between the parties.
The court's legal analysis was straightforward. Under South
Carolina's new Equitable Distribution Statute,3 marital property
1. 292 S.C. 264, 356 S.E.2d 114 (1987) (per curiam).
2. While the Orszula facts involved a workers' compensation award, arguably the
holding is equally applicable to personal injury awards. The court posed the issue as
"[w]hether workers' compensation or personal injury awards are marital property." Id.
at 265, 356 S.E.2d at 114 (emphasis added). In addition, the court cited personal injury
cases as authority for its holding that "[p]ersonal injury and workers' compensation
awards fit none of the enumerated exceptions" to the Equitable Distribution Statute,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-473 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987), and, therefore, constitute marital
property. 292 S.C. at 266, 356 S.E.2d at 115.
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-473 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1987).
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includes "all real and personal property which has been acquired
by the parties during the marriage."'4 The court reasoned that
workers' compensation awards are not expressly listed in the
statute's exceptions to this rule and, therefore, constitute mari-
tal property.5
The court is not alone in its literal interpretation of the eq-
uitable distribution statute; several foreign jurisdictions ap-
proach this issue with the same deference to their state's statu-
tory language.6 Nevertheless, some commentators argue that
"[h]owever plain the language of the relevant property disposi-
tion statutes, this is not a foregone conclusion."' 7 This strict ad-
herence to the literal meaning of the statute can produce inequi-
table results.
It has long been accepted that wages earned by either
spouse during coverture constitute marital property. The key is-
sue to be resolved is whether workers' compensation awards are
to be considered wages or some other form of separate property
to be enjoyed solely by the recipient. One Louisiana case viewed
workers' compensation awards to be the separate property of the
injured party, less lost earnings and expenses that the couple
suffered.8 In South Carolina, however, it is well settled that
"[w]orkers' [c]ompensation benefits are awarded not for a physi-
cal injury as such, but for 'disability' produced by such injury, as
measured by the employee's capacity or incapacity to earn the
wages which he was receiving at the time of his injury."" The
legislature's concern in enacting the Workers' Compensation Act
was to compensate the worker for his loss of ability "to earn
wages."' 0 This fact, coupled with the statutory language, gives
4. Id.
5. This logic can be described by the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius:
the expression of one thing excludes another. A foremost authority on legal drafting and
statutory interpretation has opined, "Sometimes the maxim applies and sometimes it
does not." R. DICKERSoN, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 37 (1986).
6. See, e.g., Queen v. Queen, 308 Md. 574, 581, 521 A.2d 320, 324 (1987).
7. Note, Workers' Compensation-Marital Property - Johnson v. Johnson, 10 N.
Ky. L. RE V. 531, 544 (1983).
8. Mead v. Mead, 442 So. 2d 870 (La. Ct. App. 1983). Community property states
report varied decisions, often holding property to be separate that their sister states hold
to be marital. Note, In Sickness and In Health? Disability Benefits as Marital Property,
24 J. FAhi. L. 657, 668 (1986).
9. Corbett v. City of Columbia, 290 S.C. 71, 73, 348 S.E.2d 191, 193 (Ct. App.
1986) (emphasis added), rev'd on other grounds, 294 S.C. 327, 364 S.E.2d 459 (1988).
10. 292 S.C. at 73, 348 S.E.2d at 193.
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credence to the court's conclusion that workers' compensation
benefits are marital property.
Holding firm to the judicial principle of deciding only issues
expressly before it, the court left unanswered important related
inquiries. Unresolved is whether the Orszula outcome would be
different if the injury had been suffered during coverture but the
award for the injury had been received after divorce.
As previously noted, the court's strict adherence to the lan-
guage of the equitable distribution statute entitled Ms. Orszula
to share her husband's award. Though Ms. Orszula nursed her
husband back to health and sacrificed to aid her husband, the
same strict construction easily could have denied her a share of
the award under slightly altered facts. For example, if every fact
had remained the same except that the check arrived a day after
the divorce, under a strict reading of the statute the award
would be considered Mr. Orzula's personal property. Not only
does this result not allow for bureaucratic oversight, it encour-
ages the claimant to delay settlement or fraudulently to conceal
delivery.
Illinois, an equitable distribution state that defines marital
property similarly to South Carolina, has addressed this issue.1
The Illinois court set aside the dogmatic literal interpretation of
the statute in favor of a reading that supplied a just result. The
court recognized that although the statute "offers no special ref-
uge for workman's compensation awards,"1 2 fairness demands
that the court hold that "if the claim for a compensation award
accrues during the marriage, the award is marital property re-
gardless of when received."' 3
By its name, it is clear that the Equitable Distribution Stat-
ute is grounded in the doctrine of equity, whose hallmark is to
consider done that which ought to be done. Certainly a spouse
should not be denied an equitable share of a workers' compensa-
tion award merely because the mailman arrived a day late.
While the payment itself has not been acquired during the mar-
riage, the right to payment certainly has accrued."4 Although
some community property states follow the misguided literalist
11. In re Marriage of Dettore, 86 IlM. App. 3d 540, 408 N.E.2d 429 (1980).
12. Id. at 541, 408 N.E.2d at 430.
13. Id. at 542, 408 N.E.2d at 431.
14. Goode v. Goode, 286 Ark. 463, 465, 692 S.W.2d 757, 758 (1985).
1988]
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approach,15 in the few common law property states directly ad-
dressing this issue, "there is unanimous agreement that the
pending claim is subject to equitable division as marital prop-
erty.""6 Notions of fairness would have South Carolina follow
this well-reasoned and justifiable approach.
1 7
A second variation of the Orszula facts, producing a differ-
ent result, is one in which a lump-sum settlement is awarded for
permanent, as opposed to temporary, disability. Because work-
ers' compensation is awarded to replace lost wages, a lump-sum
settlement for permanent disability replaces wages that would
have been earned in the future. Should a couple divorce, the re-
cipient's spouse arguably is unjustly enriched by the lump-sum
payment if the entire sum, not just that portion that reflects the
period of coverture, is considered marital property.
Maryland's highest court was persuaded by the foregoing
argument. 18 On the other hand, Kentucky, another equitable ju-
risdiction state with a similar statute, held firm to the strict
statutory interpretation.19 The Maryland court's approach is a
reasonable balancing of equitable concerns and statutory man-
date. Conversely, the Kentucky court reaches an obviously un-
just result, one that the legislature certainly could not have
15. E.g., Bugh v. Bugh, 125 Ariz. 190, 608 P.2d 329 (Ct. App. 1980).
16. Note, supra note 7, at 545-46. See also Hughes v. Hughes, 132 N.J. Super. 559,
334 A.2d 379 (1975).
17. Note that the recipient's spouse is justified in receiving an equitable portion of
the lump-sum payment in a limited circumstance when his or her spouse suffers a tem-
porary disability and makes a physical recovery during coverture. If a lump-sum award
were considered marital property, the spouse would be unjustly enriched. Thus, only
that portion of the award which compensates for loss of earning capacity during cover-
ture should be considered marital property.
18. Queen v. Queen, 308 Md. 574, 521 A.2d 320 (1987).
[W]e hold that only the portion of the husband's award compensating for loss
of earning capacity during the marriage is marital property subject to equitable
distribution by the trial judge. Due to the personal nature of the injuries giving
rise to a permanent partial disability award, we cannot conclude that the Gen-
eral Assembly intended a noninjured spouse to share in the compensation for
the injured spouse's loss of future earning capacity representing a time period
beyond the dissolution of the marriage.
Id. at 586-87, 521 A.2d at 327.
19. "Though an award of workers' compensation may be intended to replace lost
wages which otherwise would have been earned in the future, it nevertheless is money in
hand and it is not within the exceptions to [the equitable distribution statute] ... "
Johnson v. Johnson, 638 S.W.2d 703, 704 (Ky. 1982).
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intended.20
When a statute is susceptible to a broader, more just inter-
pretation, the literal interpretation should be put aside. The ju-
diciary should not enforce a rigid reading of every statute. In-
stead, it should be the promoter of justice: the medium by which
statutory enactmients can be responsive to the unforeseen machi-
nations of daily life.
James Fletcher Thompson
II. HUSBAND WHO CONSENTS TO WIFE'S ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION IS CONSIDERED LEGAL PARENT OF CHILD
In In re Baby Doe21 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that a husband who consented to his wife's artificial insemina-
tion by a donor, a process known as AID, was the legal father of
a child born as a result of that procedure. The court required
the husband to meet all the pertinent legal obligations. The
court held that a finding of either express or implied consent by
the husband would be sufficient, but it left open the burden of
proof regarding such consent.2 2
In Baby Doe the husband and wife, upon learning that the
husband was unable to father children, sought counseling about
artificial insemination. When the wife began undergoing artifi-
cial insemination, the husband assisted in daily temperature
readings. After the wife conceived, however, the parties sepa-
rated. Following the child's birth, the husband sought a declara-
tion that he was not the legal father of the child; the wife coun-
terclaimed for child support. The trial court held for the wife.23
The husband maintained that his written consent to the proce-
20. Where the workers' compensation recipient opted for periodic payments in-
stead of a lump sum, Kentucky courts have held those payments that accrue to the re-
cipient after divorce to be the personal property of the recipient.
Payments that are received, or weekly benefits that have actually accrued but
have not yet been paid as of the date of the dissolution of the marriage, are to
be included as marital property, just as earned income. But, payments which
accrue and are paid after the dissolution of the marriage are not part of the
marital property any more than the worker's future earnings would be.
Mosley v. Mosley, 682 S.W.2d 462, 463 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985). The form of payment should
not dictate the nature of the property.
21. 291 S.C. 389, 353 S.E.2d 877 (1987).
22. Id. at 393, 353 S.E.2d at 879.
23. Id. at 392, 353 S.E.2d at 878.
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dure was needed in order to declare him the father of the result-
ing offspring. The trial court, however, held that a rebuttable
presumption existed that a husband had consented to his wife's
insemination. The trial court also found express and implied
consent upon the facts of this particular case.24
The supreme court affirmed, holding that when a wife un-
dergoes artificial insemination, with the husband's express or
implied consent and with the understanding that the child will
be raised as his own, the husband is the legal father and is sub-
ject to all the obligations of paternity, including child support.25
In holding the husband legally responsible, the court aligned it-
self with the vast majority of jurisdictions ruling on that issue.21
Courts uniformly have required a husband who consents to his
wife's insemination to pay support for the child resulting from
the procedure.
The Baby Doe court declined to decide, however, where the
burden of proof lies regarding the issue of the husband's con-
sent. In failing so to decide, the South Carolina court did not
follow other courts that have addressed this issue. In K.S. v.
G.S.28 the Superior Court of New Jersey considered a case in
which a husband at first consented to his wife's undergoing AID
but claimed to have later withdrawn his consent. The court first
declared a rebuttable presumption existed that a husband con-
sented to his wife's insemination.29 The court additionally held
that revocation of consent could be shown only by clear and con-
24. Id. at 391, 353 S.E.2d at 878.
25. Id. at 392, 353 S.E.2d at 878.
26. Some early decisions, while still requiring the husband to pay support on theo-
ries of estoppel, held that children produced through AID are illegitimate. See, e.g.,
Doornbos v. Doornbos, 12 III. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956); Gursky v. Gursky, 39
Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963). Arguments against holding an
offspring of AID to be illegitimate were presented in People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280,
437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968), in which the California court reasoned that a child
born of the procedure was not conceived out of wedlock or by adultery. The mother is
usually married at the time of insemination, and if any adultery could be deemed com-
mitted, it would necessarily be with the doctor, who in this field is often a woman. Id. at
285, 437 P.2d at 501, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
27. See, e.g., People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7
(1968); R.S. v. R.S., 9 Kan. App. 2d 39, 670 P.2d 923 (1983); K.S. v. G.S., 182 N.J. Super.
102, 440 A.2d 64 (1981); L.M.S. v. S.L.S., 105 Wis. 2d 118, 312 N.W.2d 853 (Ct. App.
1981).
28. 182 N.J. Super. 102, 440 A.2d 64 (1981).
29. Id. at 109, 440 A.2d at 68.
[Vol. 40
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vincing eviden'ce.30 Likewise, the Kansas Court of Appeals in
R.S. v. R.S 3 1 required clear and convincing evidence in showing
revocation of consent and also addressed the effect, if any, of
statutes requiring the husband's written consent before the AID
procedure could be performed. In R.S. the husband orally con-
sented to his wife's insemination but, through an oversight of
the doctor, failed to sign a written consent form required by a
Kansas statute.32 The court, in rejecting the husband's claim
that his lack of written consent relieved him of paternal obliga-
tions, decided that the legislative intent underlying the statute
was to prevent criminal and civil liability resulting from the pro-
cedure and not to relieve husbands who gave oral consent to
their wives' AID from the responsibilities of fatherhood.3 The
courts in both R.S. v. R.S. and K.S. v. G.S. found compelling
interests in declaring the consenting husband the legal father
and placed a strong burden on him to overcome those interests.
Baby Doe follows the majority of decisions in other states
on the issue of paternal obligations to children born as a result
of AfD. The South Carolina court's holding, as well as those of
other jurisdictions, is justified by considerations favoring legiti-
macy of children conceived in wedlock and support of children
purposefully brought into the world. The real issue in such
cases, left undecided by the South Carolina court, lies in estab-
lishing the consent of the husband to the procedure. Although
the family court established a rebuttable presumption as to the
husband's consent, possibly in reliance on stances taken by other
jurisdictions, the supreme court declined to adopt this presump-
tion, relying instead on the finding of express and implied con-
sent to decide the case.
At first glance it may seem regrettable that the court failed
to decide the burden of proof since setting a high standard of
proof of consent, such as adopting the lower court's rebuttable
presumption standard or requiring the husband to present clear
and convincing evidence that he did not consent, would promote
strong policy considerations in favor of obligating a husband to
support his family. As a practical matter, however, evidence will
30. Id. at 110, 440 A.2d at 68.
31. 9 Kan. App. 2d 39, 670 P.2d 923 (1983).
32. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-128 (1981).
33. 9 Kan. App. 2d at 44, 670 P.2d at 927-28.
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usually exist that a husband knew of, and at least acquiesced to,
the procedure. Thus, establishing a standard of some kind would
appear to have little bearing on the outcome of future cases.
Also, although the court may sometimes feel compelled to write
dicta in an effort to guide lower courts in areas that may cause
future concern, it is reasonable to assume that cases of this type
will be rare and that such extra guidance is not needed. Overall,
Baby Doe is a well-decided opinion and falls within the main-
stream of judicial decisions concerning the newly emerging field
of biotechnology and the law.
Andrew E. Thomas
III. STATE COURT REFUSES TO GRANT FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
TO NEW YORK CUSTODY ORDER
Citing the procedural provisions of the Uniform Child Cus-
tody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA),34 the court of appeals in Purdie
v. Smalls35 refused to grant full faith and credit to a New York
custody order that was entered without affording notice and op-
portunity to be heard.
The custody dispute arose in New York between Sandra
Smalls and Stanley Purdie, the parents of a four-year-old child.
Purdie and Smalls had agreed that Smalls would receive custody
of the child, with Purdie maintaining visitation rights. Smalls
later petitioned the New York court to have Purdie held in con-
tempt for assaulting her in violation of a restraining order. Pur-
die's answer, requesting custody of the child, never reached
Smalls since it apparently was sent to her sister's address.
Before the date of the hearing, Smalls and the child moved to
South Carolina. 36 Purdie then complained that he had been de-
34. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 75-a to -z (McKinney 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-782
to -830 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
35. 293 S.C. 216, 359 S.E.2d 306 (Ct. App. 1987).
36. Smalls' stated reason for moving was to care for her ailing parents. 293 S.C. at
218, 359 S.E.2d at 307. Had her motive been to avoid service, the court presumably
would have enforced the order. One court has held that a party who intentionally evaded
service of process would be bound by the order issued in her absence. See Cunningham
v. Cunningham, 719 S.W.2d 224, 228 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). In addition, although not
considered by the court in this case, a noncustodial parent's right of visitation may result
in a court restraining a custodial parent from moving to another state. See, e.g., Weiss v.
Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981) (visitation rights of fa-
ther living in New York justified injunction restraining mother from taking the child
112 [Vol. 40
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nied visitation rights, to which the New York family court judge
responded by issuing an Order to Show Cause. Apparently, that
order also was sent to Smalls' sister's address. When Smalls did
not appear for the hearing, the judge granted Purdie temporary
custody of the child. Purdie requested the South Carolina family
court to grant full faith and credit to the order, which it did.
The court of appeals reversed,37 finding no evidence that
Smalls had received reasonable notice and opportunity to be
heard as required by section 20-7-808 of the UCCJA.38 The court
noted that such notice could have come from Purdie's custody
pleadings but that those pleadings were never served on Smalls.
In addition, the Order to Show Cause that was express mailed to
Smalls' sister's address, "even if otherwise legally sufficient," 39
gave no indication that Purdie was seeking custody of the child.
Thus, neither the pleadings nor the order provided Smalls with
notice of the custody challenge.
Having established that the notice provisions of the Act
were not met, the court of appeals cited section 20-7-808, which
provides:
The courts of this State shall recognize and enforce an initial
or modification decree of a court of another state which had
assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially
in accordance with this subarticle or which was made under
factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of
the subarticle, so long as this decree has not been modified in
accordance with jurisdictional standards substantially similar
to those of this subarticle. °
Concluding that the lack of notice violated the jurisdictional
standards of the Act in this case, the court refused to enforce
the New York order. The court then found that South Carolina
from New York to Nevada, even though the mother advanced a legitimate reason for the
move).
37. In addition to the holding that the UCCJA did not require enforcement of the
order, the court also found that the United States Constitution did not require that full
faith and credit be given to this order for two reasons. First, the order was temporary.
293 S.C. at 220, 359 S.E.2d at 308. Second, the New York court rendered the judgment in
violation of procedural due process. Id. (citing Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946)).
38. 293 S.C. at 222, 359 S.E.2d at 309.
39. Id.
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-808 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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was now the child's home state4 and could, therefore, exercise
jurisdiction to settle the custody dispute.42
Although one of the primary purposes of the UCCJA is to
"facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states, 43
the court correctly emphasized that the "other states" must first
be found to have complied with the due process provision.44
Other courts, basing their holdings on the UCCJA45 as well as
other statutory and constitutional provisions,46 agree that notice
is a strict prerequisite to the assertion of jurisdiction in custody
disputes. Aside from the issues of constitutional and statutory
41. Id. § 20-7-788. "Home state" is defined as "the state in which the child imme-
diately preceding the time involved lived with his parents,... or a person acting as a
parent, for at least six consecutive months." Id. § 20-7-786(5).
42. 293 S.C. at 223, 359 S.E.2d at 309-10.
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-784(a)(7) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
44. Id. § 20-7-808.
45. See, e.g., Lopez v. District Court, 199 Colo. 207, 211, 606 P.2d 853, 856 (1980).
(Finding the test was satisfied in this case, the court noted: "The jurisdictional test to
render a valid decree under the uniform custody act is whether the 'contestants' had
reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard."); Wachter v. Wachter, 439 So. 2d 1260
(La. Ct. App. 1983) (trial court correctly refused to enforce ex parte custody directive
since notice not given to parent as required by the UCCJA and PKPA); In re Pierce, 184
Mont. 82, 601 P.2d 1179 (1979) (Montana would not recognize Wyoming decree awarding
custody of runaway child to parents since grandparents with custody in Montana had
not received notice); Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129, 134, 581 P.2d 91, 94 (1978)
(Colorado order entered without complying with the notice provisions was not "substan-
tially in conformity with" the UCCJA); Mayer v. Mayer, 91 Wis. 2d 342, 351, 283 N.W.2d
591, 596 (Ct. App. 1979) (temporary order of custody to plaintiff-husband unenforceable
against defendant-wife, who was not given notice and opportunity to be heard: "Even if
a court has jurisdiction, a decree is not binding on any party who is not given an oppor-
tunity to be heard.").
46. See Thorne v. Thorne, 344 So. 2d 165 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (fourteenth amend-
ment due process concerns, including notice and opportunity for hearing, apply to child
custody proceedings; order entered in violation of procedural due process is void); Shad-
drix v. Womack, 231 Ga. 628, 630, 203 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1974) ("Since it is clear from the
record that no service was made upon the mother ... the order is void and must be
disregarded; and therefore it conferred no right of custody upon the grandmother as
against the mother."); Beebe v. Chavez, 226 Kan. 591, 598, 602 P.2d 1279, 1286 (1979) (in
violation of state statute, mother "was denied her right to due process; to notice and an
opportunity to be heard; to a fair hearing.... [She] had lost all, without her day in
court."); State ex rel. Thompson, 372 So. 2d 1255, 1259 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (ex parte
custody order null since notice and opportunity for hearing not afforded parent: "[I]t is
well settled in Louisiana that an ex parte custody order granted by a trial judge without
notice, service of pleadings and without affording a hearing to the parent having custody
of the child is null and without effect."); Matthews v. Second Judicial Dist. 91 Nev. 96,
97, 531 P.2d 852, 853 (1975) (court that had felt it had "waited long enough" and pro-
ceeded to enter order without giving parent notice or opportunity to be heard was in
error, and its custody order was void).
10
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rights of the parent, the requirement finds additional support in
the ultimate concern in all custody cases: the best interests of
the child. As one court explained, "The purpose of requiring no-
tice is to preserve the fairness of the hearing; and it is of vital
importance to the child, as well as the parent, that the hearing
be fair. '47 The notice provision provides that notice to persons
outside the state should be given "in a manner reasonably calcu-
lated to give actual notice"48 and lists four possible methods, in-
cluding publication "if other means of notification are ineffec-
tive. ' 49 Given the options (including publication) listed in
section 20-7-792, compliance with the procedural requirements
should not pose a problem, and orders of other states will gener-
ally be enforced in South Carolina courts.
The court's finding that the UCCJA requires notice is not
particularly surprising, since the statute expressly imposes this
requirement. This case is noteworthy, however, for another rea-
son: the court's focus is limited to the UCCJA. Although the
court did not mention it, practitioners faced with custody chal-
lenges must also consider the applicability of the Parental Kid-
napping Prevention Act (PKPA).50 In an attempt to strengthen
the perceived weaknesses of the UCCJA, the PKPA imposes on
states a federal duty to enforce certain child custody decisions of
sister states. Because the federal act also requires notice and op-
portunity to be heard,51 the result in this case under either act
presumably would be the same. The opinion is potentially mis-
leading, however, if certain broad assertions made by the court
are not read against the backdrop of the PKPA. When the court
holds that "temporary or interlocutory orders of one state are
not entitled to full faith and credit in another state,"52 it is cor-
rect as a matter of constitutional law. The PKPA, however, ex-
pressly includes "permanent and temporary orders."53 Clearly,
then, the fact that an order is "temporary" is not dispositive in
the child custody context.
47. Thorne v. Thorne, 344 So. 2d at 170 (based on fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess clause). See supra note 46.
48. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 20-7-792(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
49. Id. See also N.Y. Do). REL. LAW § 75-f (McKinney 1988).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
51. Id. § 1738A(e).
52. 293 S.C. at 220, 359 S.E.2d at 308.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1738(A)(b)(3) (1982).
1988] 115
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A thorough discussion of the general applicability and juris-
dictional requirements of the UCCJA and PKPA is beyond the
scope of this article. 4 It is important, however, that the practi-
tioner in South Carolina faced with jurisdictional issues in child
custody cases realizes that he must consider both acts.
Blaney A. Coskrey, III
IV. PARENT'S SEXUAL LIFESTYLE NOT DETERMINATIVE IN
CUSTODY PROCEEDING
At first blush, the result reached in Stroman v. Williams 55
seems striking in its unabashed liberalism and deference to al-
ternative sexual life styles. In Stroman the South Carolina Court
of Appeals held that an eleven-year-old girl should remain in the
custody of her mother, who lived in an interracial lesbian rela-
tionship, rather than reside with her father, who maintained a
traditional nuclear family with his new wife and daughter.
Closer scrutiny, however, shows that the court has charted
no new course but, instead, is merely applying the settled stan-
dard concerning whether the custody of a minor should be modi-
fied. Modification is required only if the evidence indicates a
change of conditions that substantially affects the welfare of the
child. While this approach puts the court in the mainstream of
judicial authority, it is not until compared with less tolerant ju-
risdictions that the court seems progressive in its acknowledg-
ment of the rights of parents espousing variant sexual orienta-
tions. The questions that Stroman leaves unanswered are: to
what degree the court will protect the exercise of a lesbian life
style or, conversely, at what point the court will curtail that ex-
ercise as adversely affecting the development of the child.
Appellant Thomas Stroman and respondent Joan Williams
were separated in 1980 and divorced in 1984. Although Mr.
Stroman was aware of Ms. Williams' lesbianism, he acquiesced
in the divorce decree that awarded the couple's two daughters to
Ms. Williams. In 1985 Mr. Stroman brought this action concern-
ing the younger daughter, Tiffani, alleging that Ms. Williams'
54. The UCCJA and PKPA have been the subject of considerable scholarly writing.
For a general discussion, see 1 J. MCCAHEY, CHILD CUSTODY & VISrrATION LAW AND PRAC-
TICE §§ 1.01 to 4.08 (1987).
55. 291 S.C. 376, 353 S.E.2d 704 (Ct. App. 1987).
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lesbian relationship rendered her "an unfit mother as a matter
of law."56 He also maintained that the "ongoing lesbian relation-
ship between Respondent and another woman substantially af-
fect[ed] Tiffani," thereby constituting a change of circumstances
sufficient to require a change in custody.
The threshold issue that the court considered was whether
Ms. Williams' avowed lesbianism rendered her an unfit mother
as a matter of law. The court disposed of this argument in short
order, citing several cases from other jurisdictions in support of
this settled principle. Rather than assessing the desirability of
the mother's sexual preference, the court instead acknowledged
that its paramount consideration must be the welfare of the
child58 and that a party seeking modification must demonstrate
changed circumstances that will warrant modification. 59 The
court staunchly refused to allow the mother's lesbianism to bar
custody absent a showing of an adverse affect on the child.
While the husband alleged such an adverse affect, the court
found that "he points to no evidence that supports his claim."6"
Therefore, because the husband proved no material change in
circumstances, the court affirmed the lower court in holding that
the young girl should remain in residence with her mother.
The court is correct in finding that no evidence exists in the
record sufficient to find that Ms. Williams' relationship ad-
versely affected Tiffani. The older sister testified that Ms. Wil-
liams and her lover were not demonstrative in their affection
and that Tiffani was unaffected by her mother's lesbianism.6 '
Therefore, the court had no alternative, absent creation of a new
standard, but to affirm the lower court's decision.
While the decision does provide that a mother's lesbianism
will not be deemed as constituting a per se adverse affect on her
child, the questions left unanswered by the court are equally
troublesome: is the lesbian mother granted full license to exer-
cise her lesbian lifestyle, or instead, will the court set parameters
on this exercise due to a perceived adverse affect on the child
56. Id. at 378, 353 S.E.2d at 705.
57. Brief of Appellant at 5.
58. Davenport v. Davenport, 265 S.C. 524, 220 S.E.2d 228 (1975).
59. Heckle v. Heckle, 266 S.C. 355, 223 S.E.2d 590 (1976).
60. 291 S.C. at 379, 353 S.E.2d at 705.
61. Record at 30.
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caused by an open manifestation of the mother's sexual prefer-
ence? To gain perspective on this question, it is helpful to sur-
vey other jurisdictions.
Schuster v. Schuster62 illustrates the most blatant manifes-
tation of the lesbian lifestyle that was deemed not to affect the
child adversely. In Schuster, the mother lived in a well-publi-
cized lesbian relationship with her lover and two children. Both
women were active in the homosexual cause, including the film-
ing of a movie entitled "Sandy and Madeleine's Family" in
which the children participated. 3 Though the court ordered the
women to live separate and apart, it decided that modification of
custody was not in the best interests of the children. 4
As is evident in Schuster, courts may reconcile competing
interests, the mother's desire to raise her child and the courts'
desire to protect the child from the lesbian lifestyle, by barring
the mother's spousal equivalent from the home. 5 Courts are also
prone to bar the child from being in the presence of known
homosexuals.66 Additionally, the courts are likely to consider the
potential influence the mother's live-in lover may have on the
child,67 the father's character, and the appropriateness of the fa-
62. 90 Wash. 2d 626, 585 P.2d 130 (1978).
63. The couple also advertised in a brochure entitled "The Gay Family: A Valid
Life.Style?" and offered booklets entitled "Love is for All." The children accompanied
the women on many of their public appearances. Id. at 634, 585 P.2d at 135.
64. There was no evidence in the decision that the women displayed signs of affec-
tion in the presence of the children. Id. This may account for the court's comparable
leniency.
65. In A. v. A., 15 Or. App. 353, 514 P.2d 358 (1973), a homosexual father sought to
maintain the custody of his two sons, aged thirteen and eleven years. The court found no
evidence that the "boys were being exposed to deviant sexual acts or that the welfare of
the boys was being adversely affected in any substantial way." Id. at 359, 514 P.2d at
360. The court, nonetheless, prohibited any man from living in the family home in an
effort "to safeguard the home environment against possible pernicious influences." Id. at
356, 514 P.2d at 359.
66. See In re Jane B., 85 Misc. 2d 515, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)
(mother's visitation rights were conditioned on being kept away from the mother's lover,
not going places where homosexuals were known to be present, and not involving the
children in homosexual publicity). See also N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980) (child not allowed in the presence of the mother's friend); In re J. S. & C.,
129 N.J. Super. 486, 324 A.2d 90 (1974) (visitation restrictions placed on a homosexual
father).
67. In Jane B., the court considered evidence that the mother's lesbian lover, Lucy
Q., rocked in a rocking chair incessantly and ignored the young daughter except to yell at
her. 85 Misc. 2d at 517-18, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 851. Similarly, in N.K.M., the mother's lover
was known to have "used the most scurrilous and shocking language" toward a police
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ther's household for custody of the child. s
The single most salient factor in courts' analyses is the dis-
play of affection between lesbians in the presence of a child.6 9
When a lesbian mother refrains from any demonstration of af-
fection towards other women, is not a member of a homosexual
organization, and does not attempt to inculcate the child with
her sexual orientation," a court is likely to look favorably on the
mother's custody of the child. On the other hand, when the
mother marries her lesbian lover in a "Gay-la Wedding,"7 1 en-
gages in lover's caresses such as holding hands, kissing, and
touching in the presence of the child, when the child sleeps in
the same bedroom with the couple separated only by a screen,
and when the mother admits that she will someday explain to
her son that "it is not immoral for two men to have a sexual
relationship, ' 2 courts are likely to consider these factors as ad-
versely affecting the child.
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court7 3 and South
Carolina Court of Appeals7 4 have recognized the amorphous con-
cept of the parent's morality as a proper consideration in child
custody disputes, morality is a salient concern only if relevant to
officer in the presence of the young girl that "went well beyond polite cusswords but
referred to private biological functions and to incest." 606 S.W.2d at 185. The woman
bit, kicked, and spit upon the officer and threatened to kill him. In addition, she had
discussed homosexuality with the child, suggesting it as an "alternative lifestyle." Id. at
186.
68. In M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 404 A.2d 1256 (1979), the court heard
evidence on the appropriateness of the father's home. His present wife had informed the
eleven-year-old girl "how great a 'stud' her father [was]." Id. at 437, 404 A.2d at 1262.
The children also could see nude pictures of the present wife taken in the family home
by four photographers.
69. See Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641 (Utah 1980). In Kallas the court expressed
the following: "Although a parent's sexuality in and of itself is not alone a sufficient basis
upon which to deny completely a parent's fundamental right, the manifestation of one's
sexuality and resulting behavior patterns are relevant to custody and to the nature and
scope of visitation rights." Id. at 645.
70. 169 N.J. Super. 425, 404 A.2d 1256 (1979).
71. M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 967 (0kia. 1982).
72. Id.
73. Davenport v. Davenport, 265 S.C. 524, 220 S.E.2d 228 (1975).
74. Marshall v. Marshall, 282 S.C. 534, 320 S.E.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1984). See also
Thigpen v. Carpenter, 21 Ark. App. 194, 730 S.W.2d 510 (1987), in which the court
stated "that it is contrary to the court's sense of morality to expose the children to a
homosexual lifestyle, and that it was no more appropriate for a custodial parent to co-
habit with a lover of the same sex than with a nonspousal lover of the opposite sex." Id.
at 199, 730 S.W.2d at 514.
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the welfare of a child. Many courts, including the Stroman
court, look for objective clinical evidence of the effect of a homo-
sexual parent on a child.7 1 Nevertheless, this search for empiri-
cal data is riddled with conflicting views.76
Other courts rely on a perceived social stigma that attaches
to the child of a lesbian mother as justification for denying the
mother custody." As one court noted, however, the stigma at-
taches not from living with a lesbian mother but from having a
mother who is a lesbian.78 Therefore, nothing is gained from de-
nying the mother custody. In addition, relying on the stigma
that purportedly attaches to the child of a lesbian as a basis for
custody modification may be constitutionally defective.79
A few jurisdictions have succumbed to their atavistic urges,
and instead of determining whether the record indicates that the
mother's lesbianism adversely affects the child, the court simply
presumes an adverse effect. These courts require the less oner-
ous burden of demonstrating the potential for danger: "The
courts are not required to wait until the damage is done."8 Ar-
75. The psychiatrist who was consulted offered the less than dispositive statement
that "I think some, ah, homosexual people make good parents and some don't." Record
at 83.
76. "The inability of psychiatrists to reach any degree of unanimity even as to a
basic definition or classification of homosexuality is strong evidence of the diverse and
myriad analyses. . . ." In re J.S. & C., 129 N.J. Super. 486, 497, 324 A.2d 90, 96 (1974).
For varying views, see Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 588, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1215
(1980), and Wilkerson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Life Styles, 62
CORNELL L.REv. 563, 595 (1977).
77. Thigpen v. Carpenter, 21 Ark. App. 194, 730 S.W.2d 510; S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d
64 (Ky. 1980); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982).
78. M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 404 A.2d 1256 (1979).
79. The United States Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a mother
should be denied custody of her child because of her remarriage to a man of a different
race. The court considered
whether the reality of private biases and a possible injury they might inflict are
permissible considerations for removal of a infant child from the custody of its
natural mother. We have little difficulty concluding that they are not. The
Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly
or indirectly, give them effect.
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
For an application of this concept, see S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985).
But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding statute making sodomy a
criminal offense).
80. S v. S, 608 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Ky. 1980). Unlike South Carolina, Kentucky has
enacted a statute specifically governing the modification of custody decrees. The statute
reads, in relevant part, that modification may be made if "there is reason to believe the
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guably, the court in Stroman, if it had adopted this lesser stan-
dard, would have reached a different result."1 On the other hand,
to alter judicial precedent in a thinly-veiled effort to find fault
where no fault lies, would undermine the individual protections
on which we have all come to rely.
James Fletcher Thompson
V. GOODWILL NOT TO BE MARITAL PROPERTY
In Casey v. Casey 2 the South Carolina Supreme Court ad-
dressed an issue of first impression in the state involving equita-
ble distribution of goodwill in a spouse's business. The court
held that goodwill was not marital property subject to equitable
distribution,83 placing South Carolina in the minority of states
ruling on the issue. In so holding, the supreme court overruled
the court of appeals decision that had allowed the goodwill of
the husband's business to be a factor in determining division of
marital property.
8 4
The husband had run a successful fireworks business for
several years prior to the divorce. His business assets were val-
ued at approximately $6,000. The trial court awarded the wife
$10,500, which purported to represent a twenty-one percent in-
terest in the goodwill of the business. The court of appeals
agreed that goodwill should be a factor in determining the award
of alimony but recognized that valuation of a sole proprietor-
ship's goodwill was problematic because of the difficulty in dis-
tinguishing the goodwill of the business from the entrepreneurial
skills of the spouse.8 5 Citing the absence of information in the
child's present environment may endanger seriously his physical, emotion, moral or emo-
tional health." Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.340 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981). The court
places its emphasis on the word "may." 608 S.W.2d at 65. See also Thigpen v. Carpenter,
21 Ark. App. 194, 730 S.W.2d 510 (1987); N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980).
81. Tiffani's older sister testified that lesbian affection had been displayed in her
presence from the time she was fifteen. Record at 30. The court reasonably could have
inferred that Ms. Williams would display the same affection in Tiffani's company in
years to come.
82. 293 S.C. 503, 362 S.E.2d 6 (1987) (per curiam).
83. Id. at 505, 362 S.E.2d at 7.
84. Casey v. Casey, 289 S.C. 462, 346 S.E.2d 726 (Ct. App. 1986), rev'd, 293 S.C.
503, 362 S.E.2d 6 (1987).
85. Id. at 467, 346 S.E.2d at 728.
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record that would allow an accurate determination of the good-
will value of the business, the court of appeals remanded for val-
uation of the fireworks business.86
The court granted certiorari on the questions of whether
goodwill is subject to equitable distribution and whether the
court of appeals erred in remanding only the fireworks valuation
portion of the award without considering its impact on the rest
of the equitable distribution award. The court based its holding
on two considerations. First, when goodwill of a business is de-
pendent on the owner's future earnings, it is too speculative to
be included in the marital estate. Second, these future earnings
are accounted for in the alimony award. As such, goodwill could
not be considered in equitable distribution. The court then ex-
amined the remainder of the equitable distribution award and,
finding it fair, decided that remanding the case was
unnecessary."'
The court's sparse discussion of its considerations in reach-
ing its decision makes analysis of the case difficult. At first
glance, the two factors given by the court appear at odds with
each other. If future earnings are accounted for in alimony, then
it seems that determining their value would not be any more
difficult when ascertaining the goodwill of a business. Of course,
such a view ignores two points. First, goodwill of a business
takes into account more factors than just the expected future
earnings of the business.88 Second, the rationales of equitable
distribution and alimony are different. Alimony is directed to-
ward the continuing needs of the receiving spouse. In contrast,
the purpose of equitable distribution is to divide the property of
the marriage and to sever the connections between the spouses.8 9
Thus, while a determination of future earnings is needed for ali-
mony, the court may later modify the award if the anticipated
86. Id.
87. 293 S.C. at 505, 362 S.E.2d at 7.
88. See Dibble v. Sumter Ice & Fuel Co., 283 S.C. 278, 322 S.E.2d 674 (Ct. App.
1984), for a discussion of one approach used to value the goodwill of a close corporation.
89. Johnson v. Johnson, 285 S.C. 308, 311, 329 S.E.2d 443, 445 (Ct. App. 1985)
("[A]ll issues between the parties should be resolved at [the time of judgment] so that
disputes and irritants do not linger and present further incentives to litigation. The fam-
ily court's objective should be to dissolve the marriage, sever all entangling legal rela-
tions and place the parties in a position from which they can begin anew.").
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future earnings are not realized °0 On the other hand, a property
division is final, and a spouse whose expected future earnings do
not materialize cannot later receive property back from the
other spouse if the initial property division subsequently be-
comes inequitable. One can assume the court recognized this dis-
tinction since it was reluctant to use future earnings in a prop-
erty division context.
As the court pointed out, other jurisdictions are divided on
the subject.91 South Carolina's decision in Casey puts it in the
minority of states ruling on the issue.2 Majority courts, in al-
lowing consideration of goodwill, have reasoned that the mere
difficulty in ascertaining its amount should not be a bar to its
inclusion in a division of marital property, since goodwill is often
computed in other types of actions at law.93 Also, some busi-
nesses bring in high amounts of revenue but are low in assets;
thus, failure to include goodwill may result in inequities to a
spouse whose efforts contributed to the prosperity of the busi-
ness but who will not be able to enjoy the fruits of its continued
success after the divorce. Courts in the minority view often have
relied on the rationale that since the goodwill of the business
depends upon future earnings, the receiving spouse would be
doubly compensated by awarding both alimony and an interest
in the goodwill of an ongoing enterprise.94 Moreover, such courts
have stated that, especially in a professional practice, the good-
will was inseparable from the person, in that it would be extin-
guished in the event of death, retirement, or loss of clientel.95
The Casey court failed to address specifically whether the
type of business in question should be a factor in determining
whether to include goodwill in equitable distribution. Some of
the arguments against its inclusion are weaker when viewed in a
90. White v. White, 290 S.C. 515, 351 S.E.2d 585 (Ct. App. 1986).
91. 293 S.C. at 504, 362 S.E.2d at 6.
92. See Annotation, Accountability for Goodwill of Professional Practice in Ac-
tions Arising from Divorce or Separation, 52 A.LR3D 1344 (1973).
93. See, e.g., Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791-82, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135
(1969).
94. Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis. 2d 327, 352, 309 N.W.2d 343, 355 (Ct. App.
1981) ("[T]he goodwill or reputation of [the husband's law firm] is reflected in [the hus-
band's] substantial salary. This salary was considered in setting the family support
award. To also treat the goodwill of the law firm as a separate divisible asset, would
constitute double counting.")
95. Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 1972).
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situation involving a large corporation or some other business
enterprise in which the success of the business is not particularly
dependent on the individual efforts of the spouse. Since the bus-
iness in Casey was a sole proprietorship, its treatment logically
should be much more in line with that afforded a professional
practice, but future cases before the court could reexamine this
element as a possible consideration.
In conclusion, the court in Casey placed South Carolina in
the minority of jurisdictions ruling on the issue by holding that
goodwill in a spouse's business is not property subject to equita-
ble distribution. This seems to follow South Carolina's more
conservative trend in determining what constitutes marital
property."8 Although trial courts will have an easier task by
avoiding the cumbersome chore of determining the valuation of
goodwill, they will have to take care that inequitable results are
not reached.
Andrew E. Thomas
96. See, e.g., Helm v. Helm, 289 S.C. 169, 345 S.E.2d 720 (1986) (professional de-
gree not property subject to equitable distribution); Anderson v. Anderson, 282 S.C. 162,
318 S.E.2d 566 (1984) (husband's retirement plan not marital property subject to equita-
ble distribution).
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